The one-way Faraday-Michelson system is a very useful practical quantum cryptography system where Faraday mirrors(FMs) play an important role. In this paper we analyze the security of this system against imperfect FMs. We consider the security loophole caused by the imperfect FMs in Alice's and Bob's security zones. Then we implement a passive Faraday mirror attack in this system. By changing the values of the imperfection parameters of Alice's FMs, we calculate the quantum bit error rate between Alice and Bob induced by Eve and the probability that Eve obtains outcomes successfully. It is shown that the imperfection of one of Alice's two FMs makes the system sensitive to the attack. At last we give a modified key rate as a function of the Faraday mirror imperfections. The security analysis indicates that both Alice's and Bob's imperfect FMs can compromise the secure key. * Electronic address: gaoming.zhengzhou@gmail.com
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] is one of the most realistic applications in quantum information. It can generate secure keys between two distant parties, commonly known as Alice and Bob. The unconditional security has been proven even when an eavesdropper, Eve, has unlimited computation power permitted by quantum mechanics [3] [4] [5] [6] . However, in practical QKD systems there are always some imperfections that will leave loopholes for Eve to take use of. Therefore, various hacking attacks based on the imperfections of practical QKD systems are proposed [7] . There are Trojan horse attack [8] , fake state attack [9] , phase-remapping attack [10] , time-shifted attack [11] and blinding attack [12] . Passive Faraday-mirror attack based on the imperfection of Faraday-mirrors in the two-way systems was proposed in 2011 [13] .
Since in two-way system, such as plug-and-play system [14] , Alice admits pulses from other zones in, it is vulnerable to a Trojan horse attack by Eve. Thus one-way QKD system has an obvious advantage in security over two-way system. In 2005, a novel one-way FaradayMichelson quantum cryptography (FMQC) system [15] was proposed. The simple diagram of FMQC system with Eve is shown in Fig. 1 . It is an intrinsically stable QKD system free of fiber birefringence, which makes it an important and useful practical QKD system. In Alice's zone, a laser pulse is split into two pulses by coupler C A . One is transmitted on the short arm (denoted as time mode a), and the other is transmitted on the long arm (denoted as time mode b). There is a phase modulator P M A which modulates the phase of the pulse transmitted on the long arm. The pulses are coupled by coupler C A and transmitted to Bob. After arriving at coupler C B , the pulses are split into two groups and reflected back by two Faraday mirrors, respectively. The group transmitted on the long arm is modulated by phase modulator P M B .
In this system four Faraday mirrors are used to compensate for any birefringence effect in fibers automatically and perfectly. A perfect FM is a combination of a 45
• Faraday rotator and a reflecting mirror whose Jones matrix is given by F M =   0 −1 a FM backward. The matrices can be written as
where ϕ o and ϕ e are the propagation phases of ordinary and extraordinary rays, and θ is the rotation angle between the reference basis and the eigenmode basis of the birefringent medium. The overall Jones matrix for a round trip is given by
which shows clearly that a perfect FM can compensate for any birefringence effect in fibers.
In this paper, we study the security of FMQC system against imperfect Faraday mirrors.
We calculate the changed signal states caused by two imperfect FMs in Alice's security zone. 
II. SECURITY LOOPHOLES INDUCED BY IMPERFECT FARADAY-MIRRORS
In above discussion, the angle of Faraday rotator is thought to be exactly 45
• . But in fact, the angle always has an error ε and the Jones matrix of a practical FM is given
Generally speaking, the maximal rotation angle error tolerance is 1
• . When FMs are imperfect, the birefringence effect of fibers cannot be compensated totally and additional QBER will be induced. What's worse, the imperfection of Alice's FMs will leave a loophole for Eve to obtain more information about the secure key.
For multi-photon pulses, Eve can take a photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [16] [17] [18] where she maintains one photon to measure and lets other photons pass through. Here we only consider the single-photon case. Simply and without losing generality, assume that the incoming state is the horizontal polarization state, i.e, |ψ in = [1 0] T . Then the Jones vectors of the output polarization states for the two time modes are given by
where k = 0, 1, 2, 3, and |ψ a , |ψ b are the Jones vectors of time mode a and b, respectively.
δ a is the phase modulated by the phase modulator and ε 1 , ε 2 are the rotation angle errors of F M 1 and F M 2 , respectively. When the FMs are imperfect, the states sent by Alice are not the standard BB84 states, |ψ k = (|a + e ikδa |b )/ √ 2, where δ a = π/2. The four new states are given by
We can see that the four new states are in three-dimensional Hilbert space. To show it more clearly, we let |H = cos(2ε 1 )|X + sin(2ε 1 )|Y and |V = −sin(2ε 1 )|X + cos(2ε 1 )|Y , and
Then the four new states can be rewritten as
which is quite different from Eq. (9) of Ref. [13] . The dimension of Hilbert space of the states sent by Alice is 3 instead of 2, which will give Eve more information about the secure key.
By calculating the inner products between any two of the four states we can describe them in three-dimensional Hilbert space as shown in Fig. 2 . The inner products between any two of the four states are given by
We find that all the inner products only relate to ε 2 which means ε 1 doesn't compromise the security of the system. This is easy to understand because ε 2 is the angle error of F M 2 on the path where the pulse is encoded and ε 1 is the angle error of F M 1 on the path where the pulse is just reference pulse. We can also conclude that only ε 3 will open a loophole in Bob's security zone from the symmetry between Alice and Bob. In general, the main object of Eve is to find a set of POVM operators that can minimize the quantum bit error rate between Alice and Bob induced by her attack [10] . Thus Eve can use this specific strategy to minimize the QBER:
, where |E k is the eigenvector of matrix ρ −1/2 L k ρ −1/2 corresponding to the minimal nonzero eigenvalue and r is the maximal real number ensuring that the matrix F vac = I− 3 k=0 F k is positive. Here, we use five POVM operators to distinguish all the four states sent by Alice instead of only distinguishing two states {Φ 0 , Φ 3 } in Ref. [13] . The PFM attack proposed in Ref. [13] is combined with the phase-remapping attack which can make δ a ∈ [0, π/2] and when δ a = π/2 only F 0 and F 3 can be used to minimize the QBER. But in our attack δ a can only be π/2, thus we can use F 0 , F 1 , F 2 and F 3 to distinguish all the four states sent by Alice and minimize the QBER simultaneously.
We only focus on two main parameters: the quantum bit error rate, QBER, between Alice and Bob induced by Eve's attack, and the probability that Eve obtains an outcome corresponding to F k successfully, P succ . They are defined as follow:
B. Simulation
Since the system is one-way, δ a = π/2. As the maximal rotation angle error tolerance is 1
• , we let ε 1 and ε 2 both change from −1
• to 1 • . The results are shown in Fig. 3 . From Fig. 3 (a) , we can see that the QBER is almost constant no matter how ε 1 or ε 2 changes.
In fact, the QBER changes with ε 1 or ε 2 slightly and the difference is so small that we can ignore it. As for P succ , Fig. 3 (b) shows how P succ changes with ε 1 and ε 2 . We can conclude that P succ depends on ε 2 alone. From Fig. 3 (c) we can see that when ε 2 is given, P succ is almost constant however ε 1 changes and Fig. 3 (d) shows that the bigger the absolute value of ε 2 is (which means the angle error of F M 2 is bigger), the bigger the P succ is. This can be easily explained by the results of inner products between Alice's four states in Sec II. When |ε 2 | gets bigger, each Φ k |Φ k+1 gets smaller which means the differences between the four states are bigger. Therefore, P succ gets bigger as |ε 2 | gets bigger.
Moreover, ε 2 can't be 0 • because if ε 2 = 0 • , the density operator ρ becomes
Then we can find that its rank is 2 which means the dimension of the Hilbert space becomes 2 instead of 3, thus the PFM attack is not effective. The relationship between P succ and ε 1 , ε 2 . (c) The relationship between P succ and ε 1 when ε 2 = 1 • .
Note that, when ε 2 is given, P succ is almost constant and changes very slightly with ε 1 . (d) The relationship between P succ and ε 2 when ε 1 = 1 • . Note that, the bigger the absolute value of ε 2 is, the bigger P succ is. The special point that ε 2 = 0 • is not considered in our simulation.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS AGAINST IMPERFECTIONS OF FARADAY-MIRRORS A. Security analysis against four imperfect Faraday-mirrors
In this FMQC system, there are two FMs in Alice' and Bob's zones, respectively. If Eve is the manufacturer of Alice's and Bob's instruments, she can set the rotation angle errors of the four FMs before providing the instruments to them. Thus we want to know whether Eve can take use of these four imperfect FMs to obtain more information about the secure key without the legitimate users' awareness. 
when they arrive at C B , respectively. If Eve doesn't want Alice and Bob to know the change of the states, she must control the rotation angle errors of the four FMs to always satisfy
Then we can find a solution to Eq. (11),
Since the value of k varies from {0,1,2,3} constantly and randomly when the system is running, Eve cannot set ε 1 , ε 2 , ε 3 , ε 4 to always satisfy Eq. (12) . Alice and Bob must be able to perceive the change of states. Thus Eve can't take use of four imperfect FMs to obtain more information about the secure key without the Alice's and Bob's awareness.
B. Security analysis of phase-encoded BB84 protocol against imperfect Faradaymirrors
The PFM attack in the previous section is an individual attack based on intercept-resend attack, thus it is not necessarily the optimal attack. Besides, since the minimal QBER induced is about 14.64% which is just the tolerable upper bound of error rate in individual attack, it is not realizable in this system. What legal parties want is to make their protocol secure against any attack permitted by quantum mechanics. Thus we need to perform a compact security analysis.
In FMQC system, to implement a phase-encoded BB84 protocol, Alice encodes the signals in the X basis when she chooses the phase ϕ A ∈ {0, π} and in the Y basis when she chooses ϕ A ∈ {π/2, 3π/2}. Bob decodes the signals in the same way as Alice does. In our scheme, the error rate δ X and the fraction q X of nonvacuum events are estimated when both Alice Here we follow the security proof proposed in Ref. [19] . We assume that the channel is symmetric which means q X = q Y = q ph = q and ignore the imperfections of detectors. Then the key rate in an infinite length limit is given by
where
2 is the fidelity which characterizes the basis dependence of the source.
Since we can conclude that ε 1 and ε 4 will not compromise the security of the system, we let ε 1 = ε 4 = 0 when simulating the key rate. In Eq. (13), ∆ is related to ε 2 and nonzero ε 3 can increase δ X and δ Y . Thus the imperfections of Alice's and Bob's FMs have influences on the final key rate.
We define ρ X = 1 2 3 , where δ is the inherent error rate and δ X,ε 3 , δ Y,ε 3 are the error rates induced by ε 3 in the X and Y bases, respectively. When ε 3 = 0, the bases used by Bob are not standard X, Y basis and they are given by
where k = 0, 1, 2, 3. Then the error rates induced by ε 3 are given by Fig. 4 (a) and (b) show how ε 2 and ε 3 compromise the final secure key rate, respectively.
To show the effect of ε 2 and ε 3 more clearly, we let both of them change from −5
• to 5
• .
From Fig. 4 (a) we can see that the key rate varies significantly as ε 2 changes and the effect on key rate gets more significant as δ gets smaller. Fig. 4 (b) shows that the key rate varies very slightly as ε 3 changes. We can conclude that the key rate decreases as the absolute values of ε 2 , ε 3 get bigger and ε 2 has a much more remarkable effect on key rate than ε 3 .
V. CONCLUSION
The one-way Faraday-Michelson quantum cryptography system is a very useful practical system where FMs are used to compensate for the birefringence of fiber. However, practical 
